Clientelistic Activation of Mexican Voters

Between Vote Buying and Political Communication

Ulises Beltrán and Rodrigo Castro Cornejo*

Abstract: This research analyses the clientelistic outreach in the context of modern campaigns in new democracies like Mexico. We argue that Mexican parties intensely engage in clientelistic practices due to two combined factors: *a)* electoral reforms that created incentives for parties to invest heavily on direct contact campaign strategies and *b)* adaptation of modern campaigning (GOTV get-out-the-vote campaign operations) that enable them to maximize the distribution of electoral gifts as part of their political communication strategy. This type of clientelism is not distributed by traditional machine politics targeting the poor. Instead, parties in Mexico have adapted modern political campaigning creating an effective network of clientelistic outreach. The empirical evidence for this article comes from an original survey conducted during the 2012 presidential election and the 2015 National Electoral Study (CIDE-CSES).

Keywords: public opinion, vote buying, campaigns, elections, Mexico.

La activación clientelar del electorado en México: Entre compra de votos y comunicación política

Resumen: Este artículo analiza las estrategias clientelares partidistas en el contexto de la modernización de las campañas en democracias jóvenes como México. Argumentamos que los partidos en México usan estrategias clientelares intensamente debido a dos factores combinados: *a)* reformas electorales que crearon incentivos para que los partidos puedan invertir mucho de su financiamiento público en estrategias de contacto directo y *b)* la adaptación de estrategias modernas de contacto directo que les permiten maximizar la distribución de regalos electorales como parte integral de la comunicación política en las campañas. Este tipo de contacto clientelar no se distribuye principalmente por la tradicional maquinaria electoral partidista que focaliza sus esfuerzos en los electores de menor nivel socioeconómico. Los partidos en México han adaptado técnicas modernas de campaña para crear una red efectiva de alcance clientelar como parte integral de la comunicación política. La evidencia de este artículo se encuentra en una encuesta original levantada durante la elección presidencial de 2012 y en el Estudio Nacional Electoral 2015 (CIDE-CSES).

Palabras clave: opinión pública, compra de voto, campañas, elecciones, México.

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Clientelism entails the exchange of material goods or favors for voters' political support (Stokes, 2007). Recent studies have shown that political campaigns, particularly in Latin America, distribute a wide variety of electoral gifts (González Ocantos *et al*., 2012; Kiewiet de Jonge, 2015; Nichter and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). In the case of Mexico, we have found that parties increasingly engage in clientelistic practices. While in the 2012 presidential election 27 percent of voters reported receiving electoral gifts, in the 2015 midterm election 51 percent of voters received an electoral gift: a 24-percentage points increase.[1] Our paper aims at understanding clientelistic outreach in the context of modern campaigns in new democracies like Mexico and advance the existing literature on political parties, clientelism, and campaigns.

We argue that two factors have contributed to the increase in clientelistic practices in Mexico: changes at the institutional level that created incentives for parties to invest in direct campaign strategies and use of modern campaigning operations that created a new network of clientelistic outreach. The 2008 electoral laws approved by the Mexican Congress stipulate that neither political parties nor independent groups shall buy campaign advertising on radio and television stations. Without the possibility of directly paying for television and radio ads, political parties invested their remaining public campaign funds on alternative campaign activities, particularly in direct appeals to the electorate. However, newly available campaign funds are not enough to understand the increase of distribution of electoral gifts. Our interviews with high-ranking party officials —and corroborated by our survey data— show that Mexican parties have created a new network of clientelistic outreach. They adapted the get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigning model used by American campaigns, but instead of only delivering campaign messages to increase turnout (*e.g.* via direct mail, SMS, etc.), they also directly delivered electoral gifts to voters' households.

The findings of this paper contribute to the literature of political parties and campaigns. Departing from conventional wisdom, we find that clientelism is enhanced by the political communication strategy employed by parties and candidates during GOTV campaigning. This type of clientelism is not distributed by traditional machine politics (*e.g.* Stokes, 2007) and is not exclusively focused on the poor as most clientelistic strategies (*e.g.* Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Instead, as noted by the American politics literature, modern campaigns have "revolutionized" the way parties and candidates interact with the electorate, particularly by helping them creating personalized, targeted campaign strategies (Nickerson and Rogers, 2014). In the case of Mexico, modern campaigning operations have allowed parties to maximize the allocation of electoral gifts: candidates and parties are able to deliver electoral gifts to voters' households without the need of political intermediaries.

This paper also contributes to the clientelism literature. While most studies have argued that clientelism aims to buy the vote (Dunning and Stokes, 2008), increase turnout (Nichter, 2008) or abstention (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014), reward loyalists (Stokes *et al*., 2013), or help party building (Auyero, 2000; Levitsky, 2003; Epstein, 2009), our interviews with high-ranking party officials suggest that clientelism that is distributed through GOTV campaigning not only seeks to buy the vote but also activate partisanship and strengthen party brands since, as discussed in the paper, party labels and logos are highlighted in the gifts that parties distribute during their campaigning.

The main source of information of this research are two national surveys: an original postelectoral survey conducted in the 2012 presidential election and the 2015 CIDE-CSES National Electoral Study.[2] The 2012 national survey includes 2 400

[1] Original survey conducted in 2012 and the National Electoral Study (CIDE-CSES) 2015. Details ahead.

[2] The CSES is a collaborative project with more than fifty national studies around the world. The project develops individual-level databases of participating countries with answers to a set of common questions to understand the effects of various institutional arrangements on electoral behavior and perspectives on the functioning of democracy. The project has

interviews conducted between July 13-19.[3] In 2015, two separate surveys were conducted as part of the National Electoral Study from July 18-21. The first focused on the legislative election and is representative at the national level (N = 2 400). The second was conducted only in states with state level elections: governor (N = 1 100) and municipal presidents (N = 1 300). A battery of questions aiming to measuring the proportion of voters who received electoral gifts during the campaign was included in half the sample of each survey.[4]

This paper is structured in the following way. In the first section, we describe how clientelism in Mexico has evolved parallel to the country's transition to democracy as well as the transformation of political campaigning. Later on, we describe the different types of electoral gifts distributed by parties in the 2015 midterm election in Mexico and provide evidence that GOTV campaign operations allowed parties to maximize the distribution of such gifts among the Mexican electorate.

Existing arguments about clientelism

The relationship between citizens and politicians entails a wide range of exchanges of goods and services, including programmatic and non-programmatic distributive policies (Stokes, 2005). In the case of non-programmatic distributive policies, rules are absent and policies can fall into the hands of political parties. Such partisan bias in distributive policies can be directed toward specific groups of individuals (laborers, the elderly, etc.) or involve the sharing of collective goods or services for which the distributor demands political support. The exchange of benefits for political support of groups of individuals is what is known as clientelism; it constitutes the system in which politicians, mostly through party machine politics, offer goods, services, or jobs to voters with the expectation that they will return the favor with political support (Schedler, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Stokes *et al*., 2013; Gans-Morse *et al*., 2014).

Since vote buying relies on the targeting of individuals, typically by party machine operatives (e.g. brokers nested on political networks), the literature has focused on the type of voters who are most likely to sell their vote. The "clientelism as vote buying" literature posits that party machines target swing voters (Stokes, 2005), which are most likely to be persuaded by campaign handouts. In contrast, the "clientelism as turnout buying" literature finds that brokers seem to target loyalists to mobilize them rather than swing voters who are very difficult —and expensive— to influence (Magaloni, 2006; Nichter, 2008; Stokes *et al*., 2013). Similarly, machine politics can also follow a "rewarding loyalists" strategy (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014) trying to avoid defections.

Recent literature has identified additional goals of clientelistic strategies such as abstention buying or double persuasion, in other words, buying both turnout and the vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014), as well as additional campaign targets who are highly likely to be influenced by clientelism: voters ambivalent towards democracy (Carlin and Mosely, 2015), opinionated citizens in informal social networks (Schaffer and Baker, 2015), among others. A common element to most literature on clientelism is the role of machine politics, particularly brokers who create political networks of clients targeting the poor (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Szwarcberg, 2015). Such brokers are able to identify key socioeconomic and electoral profiles and target them to influence their electoral behavior (*e.g.* vote, turnout, abstention). In this research, we

focused on five modules of diverse themes. The databases of the national studies are available in the BIIACS at CIDE. The studies of all the countries participating in the CSES can be obtained directly on http://www.cses.org/ [accessed on May 21, 2019].

[3] 2 400 effective interviews face to face to persons over the age of 18 who live in the area of the electoral section where they are interviewed in their homes. The surveys were conducted from a national probabilistic sample distributed in 234 electoral sections applying on average 10 interviews per section. The size and design of the samples guarantee for a confidence level of 95 percent a theoretical margin of error of ± 2.8 points as a whole. See detailed description in the Appendix.

[4] This study follows the same selection criteria as in the 2012 study, see footnote 3. The basic descriptive statistics analyzed in this essay are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.

depart from conventional wisdom arguing that in modern campaigns, candidates and parties rely not only on political brokers to distribute electoral gifts (Nichter and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Serra, 2016; Szwarcberg, 2015), but rely on modern campaigning that does not target exclusively poor voters. Since parties in Mexico were banned from buying campaign advertising on radio and television, parties had new incentives to invest their public campaign funding on modern campaigning techniques such as get-out-the-vote operations (Michelson and Nickerson, 2011). These new campaign operations allow parties to target households to deliver electoral gifts as detailed in the next sections of this paper.

Electoral reforms and clientelism in Mexico

In Mexico, the clientelistic relationship between parties and voters has evolved parallel to the process of democratization as well as to the transformation of political campaigning. In this process, we identify three major phases: *a)* the years before the once hegemonic party, the PRI, lost the presidential election in 2000, *b)* the years after Mexico's transition to democracy (2000), and *c)* the 2007-08 electoral reforms that changed many aspects of the electoral institutions and, relevant to the specific interest of this study, generated direct consequences for the way parties and candidates campaign.

As most literature has pointed out, the PRI's long hegemonic period is owed in large part to the party's continuous and efficient use of distributive policies. The party's decline and subsequent downfall has been linked to the reduction of resources used to support these types of clientelistic policies (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). With the support of a complex corporate organization in which the PRI was the broker (Langston, 2017) and the president the great benefactor, many benefits were distributed during this period: land to farming organizations; generous labor laws and social security for privileged sectors of workers; and free education and continuous low tax rates for the growing urban middle class. This practice continued until funds were exhausted and an increasing high inflation finally derailed the Mexican economy in the late seventies, and even more significantly, by the end of 1994.

Under a widely questioned electoral system, distributive policies were widely used and voters corresponded with political support, electoral participation (attending rallies and voting for the ruling party), and passive acquiescence between elections (Schedler, 2004). One of the distributive policies that were part of the electoral strategy of the government was the anti-poverty program "Solidaridad." During those years, the program was aimed at municipalities with medium levels of development and high risk of being won by opposition parties. In contrast, fewer resources from Solidaridad were transferred to municipalities where the opposition was weak and which did not represent any risk of electoral alternation (Magaloni, Díaz Cayeros and Estévez, 2007).

Mexico's transition to democracy led to a profound transformation of the electoral system (Magaloni, 2006; Langston, 2017), but clientelistic practices did not seem to disappear, even though several reforms introduced in Congress included strong regulations on the gifts the political parties were allowed to give during the campaigns.[5] Despite the expectation that programmatic linkages between parties and voters would be strengthened after the political change of 2000, when the PRI lost the presidency (De la O, 2015; Langston, 2017), clientelism persisted as a campaign strategy aimed at influencing voters' electoral behavior. In fact, based on an original survey conducted during the 2012 presidential election, 27 percent of respondents reported receiving an electoral gift during the campaign. Such an estimate is consistent with the 2012 Mexico Panel Survey (Lawson *et al*., 2013), which found that 8 and 21 percent of those interviewed during the first and second waves of the study, respectively, received gifts from a political party (De la O, 2015). The 2015 National Electoral Study included a battery of questions to estimate the proportion of the elec-

[5] In the 1990s, a reliable electoral system started to be constructed. It became increasingly difficult for the PRI, or any other party, to substantially modify electoral results. As a response, the PRI initiated the creation of its GOTV campaign operations that, in many aspects, remain in operation until today.

torate that received gifts during the campaign period. We found that 51 percent of voters reported receiving an electoral gift from at least one party: a 24-percentage points increase compared to our 2012 study. Both surveys rely on the same question wording so any changes on the percent of voters receiving electoral gifts is not driven by measurement.

Such a significant increase in the distribution of electoral gifts might be associated with the institutional changes introduced after the 2006 presidential election. In Mexico, parties and campaigns are primarily financed with public funds. Officially, only a fragment of their funds can be directly obtained from private donors. In turn, parties and candidates receive a very generous amount of public funds[6] (see Figure 1). From the public funds, political parties finance their national organizations and their electoral campaigns. For example, in the case of the 2006 presidential campaign, parties invested a very significant amount —almost 48 percent— of their budget to buying ads on radio and TV.[7]

However, the relationship between the media and political parties dramatically changed after the 2006 presidential election when Congress changed the rules of access to campaign advertising in radio and television. Arguing that the economic transactions between parties and the media could result in an improper relationship in which media networks could offer biased coverage on their news outlets or conversely political parties might demand biased coverage in exchange for their contracts, a major electoral reform was approved by Congress in 2007. As a result, the electoral commission (IFE) became responsible for distributing advertising slots to parties on radio and television (30 percent equally to all of them and 70 percent according to the previous vote share obtained) (Valdés Zurita, 2018).[8] In turn, parties and candidates were prohibited from buying advertising on radio and TV stations for their political communication.[9]

As previously mentioned, in 2006, political parties in Mexico invested almost 48 percent of their available public funding to buy ads on radio and TV. For the election following the approval of the electoral reform (the 2009 midterm election) the public funding for parties was reduced, but only by 25 percent despite the fact that parties did not need to buy campaign ads anymore. For instance, in Figure 1 we present the value of the funds that the INE has assigned to parties in the election years between 1997 and 2018 in current value, estimated in a value unit widely used in Mexico referred to as *Unidades de Inversión* (UDI, index unit of funds in English).[10] Parties have received close to 1 000 million UDIS of public financing regularly since 1997, with the only exception being the 2003 mid-term election, when an exceptionally large number of parties participated. In other words, in real terms, the electoral reform did not substantially reduce public funding for parties even though they did not need to spend their public funding on campaign ads anymore. This means that they, in fact, gave themselves a real increase in their available funding of almost 20 percent for the next election after the 2007 electoral reform. Without the need to spend money on radio and television, their remaining public funding was used to pay

[6] For instance, for the 2018 presidential and legislative elections, they received $6,789 million Mexican pesos. Available at: https://centralelectoral.ine.mx/2017/08/18/aprueba-consejo-general-proyecto-de-financiamiento-para-partidos-y-candidatos-independientes-en-2018/ [accessed on May 21, 2019].

[7] Special Reports prepared by the Mexican Electoral Commission (INE): Available at: http://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/Informes_Especiales_IEGAC/ [accessed on May 21, 2019].

[8] You can see a detailed description of this reform electoral campaign in Buendía and Aspiroz (2011).

[9] The electoral commission does not have to pay the media for this time, because since the 1960's the Mexican State has free access to 12.5 percent of its space for advertisement.

[10] The UDI are value units that the Central Bank (Banco de México) estimates and publishes every day to establish the value of long term contractual obligations, such as mortgage loans. UDI became necessary during the economic crisis of 1994-1995. They reflect changes in the value of money produced by inflation; therefore, they reflect its actual purchasing power. Since all the contract obligations are closed in UDIS, it is possible to use fixed interest rates and stable regular payments. On April 4th, 1995, one UDI was equivalent to one Mexican peso. Data on the public funding of the political parties can be found in http://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/Informes__PP/ [accessed on May 21, 2019].

FIGURE 1. Public funding for political parties in Mexico in election years, 1997-2018 (unit = UDIS 000,000)



In black = public funding. In grey = an estimate of the cost of campaign ads that political parties were able to broadcast on media outlets. This estimate is based on the proportion of the funding used by each party to buy media outlets for their ads before the 2008 reform.

Source: Own elaboration based on annual reports submitted by national political parties on the origin and destination of your resources in Format IA, INE. Available at: http://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/Informes__PP/ [accessed on May 21, 2019].

for other campaign activities. Survey data suggest that for the 2015 midterm election the parties invested their increased public funding heavily in the distribution of electoral gifts as we explain in the next section of this paper.

Electoral gifts in the 2015 mid-term elections in Mexico

The National Electoral Study CIDE-CSES 2015 included specific questions about the distribution of gifts by each of the participating political parties (PAN, PRI, PRD, Green Party, Morena, PT and Movimiento Ciudadano).[11] There are several things to highlight in Table 1 that show the percentage of voters who received a gift in the 2012 and 2015 elections. In first place, all parties offered gifts, with the PRI reaching the most voters (34%). Second, a significant proportion of voters received gifts from more than one party (Table A3 in the Appendix).

The distribution of gifts in the 2015 election is high not only compared to the 2012 presidential election in Mexico, but also very high compared to other elections in Latin America. Table 2 shows the proportion of voters who received a gift reported in recent clientelism studies. Although the question wordings vary among these studies,[12] data from the 2015 election represent

[11] The battery of questions was included in the middle of the sample of the two surveys: 1 200 interviews at national level, 550 at the level of the governor and 650 at the level of the mayor (N total = 2 400).

[12] Since vote buying is a reprehensible practice (social desirability bias, DeMaio 1984), respondents who received gifts may think that the interviewer might hide their response. However, the wording of the questions in our study did not include the phrase "in exchange for your vote" in order to record all kinds of gifts that the respondent may have received and minimize the social desirability bias. Consistent with previous studies, our research also included a list experiment (González Ocantos *et al.*, 2012; Kiewiet de Jonge, 2015). Like

TABLE 1. Voters receiving gifts from each party (percentage)

Year	Election	At least one gift from one party	PAN	PRI	PRD	PV	Morena
2012	Presidential	27	9	20	7	–	–
2015 (CSES)	Congress	51	20	34	16	26	6
	Governor	41	17	26	13	13	6
	County	58	26	42	20	25	8
	Average	**51**	**22**	**34**	**17**	**24**	**7**

Source: Original Survey (2012) and National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

TABLE 2. Clientelism in recent elections in Latin America: Voters who received a gift from at least one political party (percentage)

Survey	Election	Voters
Mexico 2015	Congress	**51**
Mexico 2012	Presidential	**27**
Nicaragua (2008)	County	24
Mexico (2009)	Congress	23
Honduras (2009)	General	22
Mexico Panel (2012)	Presidential	21
Guatemala (2011)	General	14
Bolivia (2010)	General	8
Nicaragua (2011)	General	8
Argentina (2011)	Presidential	7
Chile (2009)	General	6
Bolivia (2009)	Congress	5
Uruguay (2009)	Presidential	1

Source: Mexico 2012: National survey prepared by BGC, Ulises Beltrán y Asocs., S.C. 1 200 national representation questionnaires July 2012. Mexico 2015: Estudio Nacional Electoral, CIDE-CSES (2015). From Nicaragua 2008 and Uruguay 2009, González-Ocantos *et al.* (2012); Kiewiet de Jonge (2015).

other recent studies that find that list experiments yield unexpected results (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Coutts and Jann, 2011), our list experiment underestimated the proportion of voters who reported receiving gifts with respect to the direct question. It is important to note that, in contrast to other studies that are based on a direct question that includes a filter question, our study includes independent questions that ask if voters received gifts from each political party (in Table A2 in the Appendix we present all the complete questions). According to previous studies, including a filter question makes it too easy for respondents to answer "no" (Blais *et al.*, 2011; Castro Cornejo, 2019) and this tendency is particularly in areas where a negative response might be socially desirable, for example, saying that one is "independent" when one asks for partisan identity (Keith *et al.*, 1992). The direct question we use helps people remember if they received a favor or a gift by asking them to remember each interaction with each political party. Table A5 in the Appendix reports the results of the list experiment. The analysis of this article is based only on the direct question.

more than double than in any other Latin American election.

We now examine some alternative hypotheses about the reasons that could explain this large difference in the proportion of people who received a gift in the 2015 elections.

1. The difference may be driven by question wording. Even though the question wording

in 2012 and 2015 is almost identical, given the different nature of presidential and legislative elections, the questions report some minor differences. In the 2012 study we asked the respondents if they had received a gift from the candidates running for the Presidency, and we mentioned each one by name and the parties that nominated them.[13] In the 2015 survey we asked if they had received any gift or help from "any of the candidates for federal deputy" of each of the political parties.[14] While this explanation seems plausible, it does not seem enough to explain such a big difference. After all, the question is the same and only the subjects who distributed the gifts changed.

2. The most widespread distribution of gifts in 2015 is explained by the return of the PRI to power in the federal elections in 2012. The evidence does not support this hypothesis. Previous studies have pointed out that clientelistic practices in Mexico are mainly explained because the PRI had a large intermediary machinery built for decades in power (Magaloni 2006; Greene, 2007), or because as the incumbent party it had more resources at its disposal than the opposition (Nichter and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). The data from the National Electoral Study document that the PRI was not the only party that distributed gifts in the 2015 election. In fact, a small party like the Green Party distributed gifts to a quarter of the electorate (24 percent), followed by the PAN (22 percent) and the PRD (17 percent), through intense direct contact campaigns, as we will see later in detail. That is to say, if the return of the PRI to the Presidency was what explains the increase in the distribution of gifts in 2015, this increase would concentrate notably on the distribution of gifts by the PRI, which does not happen.

3. Given that, as we saw, all parties distribute gifts when they campaign and that being incumbent party facilitates this practice since they have more means for the distribution of non-programmatic resources, another alternative explanation suggests that the increase in clientelism in 2015 has to do with the diversity of incumbent parties at the state level. Indeed, the data suggest that both PAN and PRD distributed more gifts in those states where they were incumbents at the governor level (Figure A1 in the Appendix). However, before 2015, opposition parties at the federal level also governed several state governments and there was no similar distribution of gifts, so it is unlikely that the increase in gifts that year is due to its status as incumbents, which was quite similar between 2012 and 2015. The general composition of who was incumbent at the level of governors did not change substantially until 2016, when the PAN won a significant number of governorships. The party system changed almost nothing until the appearance of Morena, who participated for the first time in 2015 in a National election. It is likely that the increase in patronage by the PRD has been an effort to try to neutralize Morena, her main competitor on the left. With the available data, we cannot prove this alternative explanation. However, even if that explanation were true, it would only explain the increase in gifts distributed by the PRD, which constitutes a minimum proportion of the gifts distributed in 2015, which was mainly concentrated in the PRI, the Green Party and PAN.

The distribution of gifts increased significantly in the legislative election of 2015 because it reached voters of strata that traditional machine politics did not use to reach. As we explain in the next section, this study argues that recent strategies in political campaigns allowed the parties to create an efficient network of clientelistic distribution that allowed them to reach voters from practically all strata, as can be seen in Figure 2. The likelihood of a person receiving a gift from a party is similar in all levels of education. In other

[13] During the last election campaign, did you receive any gift or help from the candidate (parties who postulate it), name of the candidate?

[14] During the electoral campaign for federal deputies, did you receive any gift or help from any of the candidates for federal deputy of the (party)...?

FIGURE 2. Probability of receiving a gift (across levels of education)



Levels of education: *(1)* Unfinished primary education, *(2)* Completed primary education, *(3)* Unfinished education, *(4)* Completed secondary education, *(5)* Unfinished upper secondary education, *(6)* Higher secondary education completed , *(7)* University studies.

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Table A4 in the Appendix presents the results of the logistic regressions based on which these probabilities were estimated with all the control variables included: party identity, gender, education, age, rural or urban district, party in the power in the place where the respondent lives and the type of choice. Confidence interval = 90 percent.

words, it did not focus exclusively on the poorest strata, as seems to be the case with most clientelistic strategies (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012).[15]

However, the availability of more economic resources for the campaigns —which we discussed earlier— is not sufficient to explain the increase in the distribution of electoral gifts in campaigns in Mexico. After all, electoral reforms were already in effect in the 2009 mid-term election and the 2012 presidential election. But not until 2015, the proportion of distributed gifts increased substantially. In the next section, we analyze how parties created new efficient direct contact networks that allowed them to distribute gifts in the homes of voters without the need for intermediaries.

[15] Kiewiet de Jonge (2015) reports similar findings.

Modern campaigns: a direct network of clientelistic outreach

The campaigns literature in American Politics has found the effectiveness of direct appeals in influencing the vote and turnout via get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign operations. Ever since the seminal study of Gerber and Green (2000), the literature has tested the effects of door-to-door canvassing (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003; Nickerson, 2006), phone calls (Gerber and Green, 2000; Nickerson, 2005), delivered mails (Green, Gerber and Larimer, 2008) and e-mails (Nickerson, 2006; Stollwerk, 2006), with more than a hundred field experiments conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of these tactics of voter mobilization (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). The logic is straightforward: direct, targeted campaign appeals are more effective in influencing electoral behavior than broader campaign outreach. This research, in fact, has revolutionized modern po-

TABLE 3. Direct campaign outreach GOTV (2015)
Respondents who were directly contacted by at least one party (percentage)

At least one direct appeal	Face to face	Direct mail	Telephone calls	SMS message	E-mail
63	49	28	27	17	10

Source: ENE-CSES (2015).

litical campaigning (*e.g.* 2008 President Obama's campaign as the benchmark for modern campaigning, Issenberg, 2012): rather than campaigning to wide audiences, data-driven campaigning tests the most effective messages and the best way to deliver them creating personalized, targeted campaign strategies. Relying on public voter files —which contain individual past voting history, demographic information, and contact information— as well as purchasing citizen information from commercial vendors, parties and GOTV organizations in the U.S. have created large voter databases (McAuliffe and Kettmann, 2007) allowing them to target campaign communications more efficiently. In turn, data analysts create models predicting which types of voters will be most and least responsive to specific direct campaign communications (Nickerson and Rogers, 2014).

While in Mexico individual voters' past history files are not available, political campaigns increasingly rely on direct campaign strategies (referred to as "direct contact" or *contacto directo* by most campaign managers in Mexico), by creating their own files of voters. Political campaigns analyze the performance of political parties at the precinct level (*sección electoral*), focusing on the percentage of the precinct that had voted for their party in the recent past, and target those precincts, delivering campaign information via flyers, pamphlets, and letters. Moreover, in our conversations with high-ranking officials of political parties,[16] they highlighted how telephone calls have been used much more intensely in the last years to widen the reach of direct contact strategies. For example, computerized autodialers deliver pre-recorded messages (robocalls), and once the message is heard, respondents are asked to dial a number and most likely the number is registered in a database. In other cases, in what is known as "push polls" (biased surveys conducted by campaign organizations),[17] respondents are asked to answer a poll and their responses are used to identify their political preferences. Similar strategies use SMS messages for mobile telephones. Using these databases, on election day, parties and candidates deliver telephone and SMS messages aimed at increasing turnout among those voters who have been identified by campaign organizations as likely voters.

These strategies have allowed campaigns to increase their direct outreach in Mexico. Data from the 2015 National Electoral Study included a battery of questions inquiring as to whether respondents were contacted during the mid-term election on specific ways: by direct mail, telephone calls, SMS messages, and e-mail. Table 3 shows that campaign direct appeals were widespread. On average, more than half of electorate was contacted by *at least one political party*,[18] particularly face to face (49%) or by direct mail (28%) and telephone calls (27%).

Targeted campaign strategies not only allow parties to directly contact the electorate, but also allow campaigns to reach a different type of vot-

[16] We interviewed high-ranking officials from the PAN, PRI, and Green Party.

[17] A practice considered unethical by all polling firms in Mexico.

[18] If they were contacted by the PAN, PRI, PRD, Green Party, PT, Morena, and MC.

ers than traditional machine politics. Figure 3A reports the probability of being contacted face to face by any political party, as a more traditional way of campaign contact, and Figure 3B reports the probability of being contacted if a voter was contacted by direct mail, telephone calls, SMS messages, and e-mail, as a more novel way of campaign contact employed by parties to target voters.[19] We include both operationalizations to be sure that our empirical strategy is not driving the results.[20] Particularly in the latter case (novel GOTV campaigning), campaign operations did not seem to target the poor as traditional machine politics, but urban voters ($p < 0.01$) and voters with higher levels of education ($p < 0.01$). Face to face campaign contact does not report any substantial education bias ($p > 0.10$): voters across different levels of education were equally likely to be contacted face to face.

However, unlike the U.S. experience, in Mexico, the GOTV campaign operations do not only seek to increase turnout on election day. Political campaigns adapted GOTV operations to deliver electoral gifts to targeted households. As noted by our conversations with party officials —also reported by several media outlets— this strategy was used for the first time by parties in 2012 but was widespread during the 2015 midterm election, particularly in its use by the Green Party and the PRI. In other words, while the 2008 electoral reforms that we refer as a necessary condition were already in place since 2009, political parties were able to create the necessary infrastructure and organization to deliver electoral gifts not until 2015, when we register a substantial increase in the proportion of voters who received electoral gifts. This campaign strategy that rely on GOTV campaigning was widely reported on by media outlets (e.g. "Backpacks and school supplies, the new products that the Green Party distributes", *La Jornada*, 2015). In fact, during the campaign, the Green Party was accused by the PRD and Morena to the Mexican electoral commission, and later on, to the Mexican Electoral Court, alleging that such distribution of electoral gifts —including movie tickets, gifts cards, a backpack with complete school supplies, etc. and, in many cases, along with a personalized letter inviting to support the candidate/party— constituted an explicit campaign effort to buy the vote.

While we cannot know which voters were targeted by GOTV campaign operations, we can estimate the probability of receiving a gift when a voter self-reported that she/he was contacted regarding any GOTV operation. For those purposes, figure 4 reports the predicted probabilities. Regardless of the operationalization,[21] voters who were contacted by GOTV operations were substantially more likely to receive a gift than when a voter was not contacted ($p < 0.01$, figure 4). To offer some contextualization, while the probability that an average voter received a gift was 27 percent during the 2012 presidential election, in 2015, the probability that an average voter received a gift when he/she was not contacted by GOTV operations was 38 percent but increased beyond 60 percent when he/she was contacted by GOTV operations (figure 4). Such gap suggests than in the absence of GOTV operations, clientelism might not have registered the noticeable increase reported. It is important to highlight, as previously mentioned, that our measure of GOTV is not correlated with low levels of education so we are fairly confident that we are not relying on a proxy variable that is closely connected to our dependent variable (*e.g.* receiving electoral gifts).

In the next section of this paper, we describe the different types of electoral gifts distributed by political parties and provide evidence that GOTV operations maximized the allocation of electoral gifts, particularly for the campaigns of the PRI and Green Party.

[19] 1 = Contacted; 0 = Not contacted. Table A6 in the Appendix reports complete logistic regressions with control variables.

[20] In Table A10 in the Appendix we include a third alternative operationalization. An index that combines only telephone and mail contact (which are primarily used by GOTV campaign operations). Results are identical.

[21] *(1)* Face to face *(2)* By mail, telephone calls, or SMS messages by at least one political party.

FIGURE 3A. Probability of being contacted by GOTV (face to face)



FIGURE 3B. Probability of being contacted by modern GOTV (index)



Levels of education: *(1)* Less then elementary school (not finished), *(2)* Elementary school, *(3)* Middle school (not finished), *(4)* Middle school (finished), *(5)* High school (not finished), *(6)* High school (finished), *(7)* College/grad school.

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Table A6 in the Appendix reports logistic regressions along with control variables (partisan/independent, education, age, gender, incumbent party, and type of election). CI = 90 percent.

FIGURE 4. Probability of receiving an electoral gift



Source: Original Survey (2012) and National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Table A6 in the Appendix reports logistic regressions along with control variables (partisan/independent, education, age, gender, incumbent party, and type of election). CI = 90 percent.

What kind of electoral gifts do parties distribute?

The 2015 National Electoral Study included a follow-up question that asked respondents to specify which gift they received.[22] We coded the answers and created two categories: *1)* campaign merchandise and *2)* gifts with some market value. Campaign merchandise constitutes a substantial proportion of giveaways: 69 percent of the total electoral gifts distributed by campaign organizations. This strategy differs from political campaigning in other party systems like that of the U.S. in which candidates sell their campaign merchandise to raise money for campaign funds.[23] Instead, in Mexico, parties and candidates distribute them for free. According to our data, the two most common gifts that voters reported receiving were t-shirts and hats. Respondents also mentioned pens, glasses, *tortilleros*, grocery bags, and umbrellas (Table A8 in the Appendix reports the most common gifts distributed by each party).

As noted in figure 5, party labels are a major component of such campaign merchandise. Unlike weakly institutionalized party systems in which party labels are unstable (Mainwaring, 2017), in Mexico, a stable party system[24] with high levels of partisanship[25] compared to the average

[22] *Could you tell me what did you receive?*

[23] "Obama Campaign Rewrites Fundraising Rules by Selling Merchandise". Tucker and Teo ([2009] 2017).

[24] In the 1990-2015 period, the Mexican system, along with Uruguay, Dominican Republic, and Chile registered almost perfect stability in the main contenders in Latin American presidential elections. When additional indicators are added (interparty electoral competition and stability of parties' ideological positions), Uruguay, Mexico, and Chile constituted the most stable systems in Latin America (Mainwaring, 2017). The 2018 presidential election represents a major electoral shock in Mexico's recent electoral history, but it is not the focus of this paper.

[25] For example, the 2006 and 2012 Mexico Panel Surveys (Lawson *et al*., 2007; Lawson *et al*., 2013), report an average partisanship of 63 and 70 percent, respectively. In Table A9 in the Appendix we report levels of partisanship in Mexico based on the CSES surveys.

FIGURE 5. Campaign merchandise in 2015

Source: Own elaboration.

of the region: two thirds of the electorate self-identifying with a political party and party labels are meaningful and can send important messages to the electorate. While the literature on party cues suggests that visual cues can affect vote choice (Schaffner, Streb and Wrigh, 2007) and help increase turnout (Schaffner & Streb 2002), in our conversations with political brokers ("operadores") and high-ranking officials of political parties, we noted an increasing tension between them. While the brokers supported the use of these practices, high-ranking political leaders were less optimistic about their efficacy mostly due to the difficulty of assuring compliance. While they "hope" that gifts can affect voters' electoral behavior, they suggested that the goal of distributing campaign merchandise was primarily to increase campaign interest among their supporters (activate partisanship) and build partisan presence in neighborhoods by increasing the salience of their party image.

In addition to the regular campaign merchandise, parties also distribute gifts with a higher market value that seem to have a different goal: buying the vote, which constitutes 31 percent of the total electoral gifts distributed during the election. These gifts include cash, groceries (*despensas* in Spanish), gifts cards, movie tickets, construction materials (*cemento*), etc. In this category, we also included campaign merchandise such as backpacks with school supplies and watches that have a higher market value than regular campaign merchandise. While parties present them as regular campaign merchandise, they seem to serve a goal other than regular campaign merchandise (*e.g.* buying the vote). It is worth noting that parties that distributed such gifts —particularly the Green Party— were typically delivered via mail and/or via delivery companies, and, in most cases, along with a personalized letter inviting voters to support the candidate(s) on election day.

Table 4 reports the proportion of campaign merchandise and gifts with some market value across parties. The Green Party along with the PRI were the parties that distributed most of the gifts with some market value, most aiming to buy the vote. In the case of the Green Party, the movie tickets, watches, and school bags with school supplies were the most mentioned gifts. In the case of the PRI, cash and groceries were the gift most mentioned.

To evaluate if voters who were contacted by GOTV campaign operations were indeed more likely to receive gifts, we created an additive index that measures the number of times that a respondent was contacted by GOTV operations. The index was rescaled ranging from 0 (no contact) to 1 (maximum contact). The dependent

TABLE 4. Type of electoral gift received by voters during the campaign (2015) (percentage)

	PAN	PRI	PRD	Green Party	Morena
Did not receive an electoral gift	78	65	83	77	93
Gifts with low market value (not vote buying): *Campaign merchandise:* pens, grocery bags, t-shirts, hats, cups, glasses, etc.	18	27	12	10	5
Gifts with some market value (vote buying): Cash, construction material, groceries (despensas), gifts cards, movie tickets, watch, school bag with school supplies	4	8	5	14	2

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

variable of the following models constitutes the probability of receiving *a)* campaign merchandise, *b)* a gift with some market value) or *c)* not receiving an electoral gift.[26] Figures 6A and 6B show that, in fact, voters who were contacted by GOTV operations were more likely to receive gifts. In almost every case, as the GOTV index increases voters are more likely to receive electoral gifts, particularly from the PAN and PRI. The case of the Green Party is remarkable. As reported previously, the Green Party is the only party that distributes more electoral gifts with some market value. As figure 6 suggests, such distribution was particularly strong among voters who were contacted by GOTV campaign operations.

Discussion

Departing from conventional wisdom, this research finds that clientelism in Mexico has evolved along with the broader party system and political campaigning. Clientelism strategies are a core part of the political communication portfolio used by parties and candidates to get out the vote. Moreover, modern campaigns in Mexico have been able to appeal to broader segments of the electorate (not only targeting the poor) by adapting GOTV operations to distribute gifts in targeted households creating an efficient network of clientelistic outreach.

A relevant question of this study is the role of social desirability bias. While survey data provide reliable information about the proportion of the electorate that receives electoral gifts during campaigns, it can underestimate the distribution of expensive gifts. Since it is a socially undesirable practice, some voters might prefer to avoid telling the interviewer that they received gifts that might be perceived unfavorably. Although they made up a very minor percentage in our survey, some voters who reported receiving gifts preferred to avoid answering which gift they received. Similarly, it is also possible that some respondents avoided reporting receiving expensive gifts. However, given that half of the sample of our study has reported receiving an electoral gift, the logic of the findings of this paper is sufficiently compelling to advance the existing literature on clientelism in new democracies like Mexico.

Our findings also show that clientelism is increasing in Mexico and that all parties participate in such practices. This is consistent with Greene

[26] Table A10 in the Appendix reports an alternative way of modeling the dependent variable. The results do not differ substantially.

FIGURE 6A. Probability of being contacted by GOTV operations and received an electoral gift



FIGURE 6B. Type of gifts and GOTV campaign operations



Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Table A6 in the Appendix reports logistic regressions along with control variables: PID, education, age, gender, incumbent party, and type of election. CI = 90 percent.

and Sánchez (2018)'s observation that the Mexican party system, while stable, is becoming less institutionalized: clientelistic linkages seem increasingly stronger as shown by the CSES data. Future studies should study the specific ways in which each political party strengthen their clientelistic linkages with their constituents. As we found in our study, parties are more successful to distribute electoral gifts when they are the incumbents at the gubernatorial level (and, arguably, they have more resources and structure to distribute clientelistic goods).

Future studies should analyze how modern campaigning influences clientelistic practices in other party systems. If this study is replicated in party systems in Latin America in which new parties have not invested on new modern political campaigning, clientelism that is distributed through GOTV campaigning might be less prevalent than in Mexico. On the contrary, in party systems in which parties rely on public funds for political campaigning or in countries in which parties have invested resources on modern campaigning, clientelism through GOTV might also be prevalent. **Pg**

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Appendix

TABLE A1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Type of election	4800	1.84	0.90	1	3
Incumbent party	4800	2.07	0.62	1	3
Type of precinct	4800	2.58	0.75	1	3
Partisan	4466	0.64	0.48	0	1
Female	4800	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	4800	2.32	0.96	1	4
Education	4719	4.45	1.76	1	7
Economic activity	4723	1.73	1.03	1	5
Type of job	2733	2.58	1.22	1	5
Income	3820	3.67	1.86	1	10
Political information	4800	2.03	1.02	0	3
Received at least one gift	2400	0.51	0.50	0	1
Gift from PAN	2400	0.22	0.41	0	1
Gift from PRI	2400	0.35	0.48	0	1
Gift from PRD	2400	0.17	0.37	0	1
Gift from Green Party	2400	0.23	0.42	0	1
Gift from Morena	2400	0.07	0.25	0	1
Contacted face to face	4800	0.49	0.50	0	1
Contacted by mail	4800	0.29	0.46	0	1
Contacted by telephone	4800	0.27	0.44	0	1
Contacted by SMS	4800	0.17	0.38	0	1
Contacted by e-mail	4800	0.10	0.31	0	1
Index (GOTV)	4800	0.44	0.50	0	1

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

TABLE A2. Question wording

Question	English
Mexico 2012 (Original survey)	During the last political campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from the PAN candidate [name of candidate]? Can you let me know what you received? [up to three responses]
	During the last political campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from the PRI-Green Party candidate [name of candidate]? Can you let me know what you received? [up to three responses]
	During the last political campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from the PRD-PT-Movimiento Ciudadano candidate [name of candidate]? Can you let me know what you received? [up to three responses]
2015 CSES: Received gift (Congress)	During the legislative campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from any of the candidates running for Congress from the..... (political party)?
2015 CSES: Received gift (gubernatorial)	During the gubernatorial campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from the candidates nominated by the (political party)?
2015 CSES: Received gift (mayoral)	During the mayoral campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from the candidates nominated by the (political party)?
Follow-up question	Can you tell me what did you receive?
CSES: GOTV	I am going to read a list of political parties. For each one, can you let me know if you were contacted by that party either face to face or by any other way during the last campaign. Were you contacted by the (political party)?
By mail	Were you contacted by mail?
By telephone	Were you contacted by telephone?
By SMS	Were you contacted by text message?
By e-mail	Were you contacted by e-mail?
By Facebook/Twitter	Were you contacted by Internet (Facebook or Twitter)?

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

TABLE A3. Number of gifts received during the campaign (direct question) (percentage)

	Legislative	Gubernatorial	Mayoral
Zero gifts	50	59	42
One gift	19	19	17
Two gifts	16	12	20
Three gifts	10	5	14
Four gifts	4	3	4
Five gifts	1	1	2
Six gifts	1	1	2
Mean	1.07 (1.35)	0.83 (1.31)	1.32 (1.48)

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Standard deviation in parenthesis.

TABLE A4. Clientelism across levels of education: Logistic regression (DV = probability of receiving gifts)

Election: governor	-0.37***
	(0.12)
Election: mayoral	0.25**
	(0.11)
Incumbent: PRI	-0.44***
	(0.11)
Incumbent: PRD	-0.05
	(0.13)
Precinct: rural/urban	-0.34*
	(0.19)
Precinct: urban	-0.11
	(0.13)
Partisan	0.63***
	(0.10)
Education (2)	0.50*
	(0.29)
Education (3)	0.63**
	(0.29)
Education (4)	0.39
	(0.28)
Education (5)	0.60**
	(0.30)
Education (6)	0.20
	(0.29)
Education (7)	0.22
	(0.30)
Female	-0.09
	(0.09)
Age: 26-40	0.03
	(0.13)
Age: 41-60	-0.13
	(0.13)
Age: 61+	-0.13
	(0.22)
Constant	-0.24
	(0.32)
Observations	2 269
R-squared	0.04

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). Standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Levels of education: (1)* Less than elementary school (not finished), *(2)* Elementary school, *(3)* Middle school (not finished), *(4)* Middle school (finished), *(5)* High school (not finished), *(6)* High school (finished), *(7)* College/Grad school. *Base category:* election (Congress); age (18-25); precinct (rural); incumbent (PAN).

TABLE A5. List experiment

	Legislative	Gubernatorial	Mayoral
Treatment	2.08 (1.10)	1.66 (1.02)	1.93 (0.98)
Control	2.00 (0.99)	1.64 (0. 96)	1.88 (0.91)
Difference	0.076	0.052	0.072
Percentage points	7.6	5.2	7.2
Direct question	50.4	41.0	57.9

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Note:* Standard deviation in parenthesis.

TABLE A6. GOTV campaign outreach (logistic regressions)

	VD = Face to face	VD = GOTV INDEX
Election: governor	0.09	-0.19**
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Election: mayoral	0.22***	0.26***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Incumbent: PRI	-0.01	-0.77***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Incumbent: PRD	0.02	-0.40***
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Partisan	0.51***	0.69***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education (2)	-0.16	0.31
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Education (3)	0.08	0.50**
	(0.21)	(0.22)
Education (4)	0.04	0.49**
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Education (5)	0.20	0.84***
	(0.21)	(0.23)
Education (6)	0.06	0.95***
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Education (7)	0.30	1.01***
	(0.21)	(0.22)
Female	-0.03	0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age: 26-40	0.32***	0.25***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age: 41-60	0.34***	0.19*
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Age: 61+	0.38**	0.28*
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Precinct: rural/urban	0.18	-0.17
	(0.13)	(0.14)

TABLE A6. GOTV campaign outreach (logistic regressions) (continuation)

	VD = Face to face	VD = GOTV INDEX
Precinct: urban	0.14	0.43***
	(0.11)	(0.12)
Constant	-0.89***	-1.42***
	(0.24)	(0.26)
Observations	4558	4558
R-squared	0.02	0.07

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). Standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Levels of education: (1)* Less than elementary school (not finished), *(2)* Elementary school, *(3)* Middle school (not finished), *(4)* Middle school (finished), *(5)* High school (not finished), *(6)* High school (finished), *(7)* College/Grad school. *Base category:* election (Congress); age (18-25); precinct (rural); incumbent (PAN).

TABLE A7A. Clientelistic outreach and GOTV contact: Comparison between 2012 and 2015

Logistic regression (DV = Probability of receiving gifts)	
Year: 2015	0.73***
	(0.04)
Education: Middle school	0.20***
	(0.06)
Education: High school	0.20***
	(0.07)
Education: College+	0.04
	(0.08)
Female	0.04
	(0.04)
Age: 26-40	0.08
	(0.06)
Age: 41-60	0.07
	(0.06)
Age: 61+	0.12
	(0.09)
Precinct: rural/urban	-0.17**
	(0.08)
Precinct: urban	-0.05
	(0.06)
Incumbent: PRI	-0.17***
	(0.05)
Incumbent: PRD	0.09
	(0.06)
Constant	0.31***
	(0.09)
Observations	3583
R-squared	0.09

Source: Original Survey (2012) and National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). Standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Base category:* year (2012); election (Congress); education (elementary school); age (18-25); precinct (rural); incumbent (PAN).

TABLE A7B. Effect of face to face canvassing and GOTV (2015)

Logistic regression (DV = Probability of receiving gifts)		
Face to face	0.84***	
	(0.10)	
GOTV index		1.19***
		(0.10)
Incumbent: PRI	-0.48***	-0.25**
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Incumbent: PRD	-0.09	0.03
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Election: governor	-0.42***	-0.34***
	(0.12)	(0.13)
Election: mayoral	0.22*	0.22*
	(0.11)	(0.12)
Partisan	0.56***	0.49***
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Education (2)	0.50*	0.34
	(0.29)	(0.32)
Education (3)	0.58**	0.56***
	(0.29)	(0.32)
Education (4)	0.34	0.23
	(0.28)	(0.31)
Education (5)	0.52*	0.38
	(0.30)	(0.32)
Education (6)	0.13	-0.09
	(0.29)	(0.31)
Education (7)	0.11	-0.11
	(0.30)	(0.32)
Female	-0.09	-0.14
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Age: 26-40	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age: 41-60	-0.20	-0.18
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age: 61+	-0.23	-0.21
	(0.23)	(0.24)
Precinct: rural/urban	-0.34*	-0.40**
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Precinct: urban	-0.09	-0.29**
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Constant	-0.45	-0.37
	(0.33)	(0.35)
Observations	2269	2269
R-squared	0.0677	0.0913

Source: Original Survey (2012) and National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). Standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A8. Most Common gifts received by voters

Legislative election (national survey)				
PAN	**PRI**	**PRD**	**Green Party**	**Morena**
T-shirts (28%)	T-shirts (31%)	T-shirts (31%)	Backpacks with school supplies (42%)	T-shirts (32%)
Hats (22%)	Hats (19%)	Hats (18%)	T-shirts (20%)	Hats (16%)
Pens (9%)	Groceries (8%)	Groceries (13%)	Hats (6%)	Pens (9%)
Gubernatorial and mayoral elections (subnational survey)				
T-shirts (37%)	T-shirts (33%)	T-shirts (26%)	Backpacks with school supplies (34%)	T-shirts (36%)
Hats (18%)	Hats (15%)	Groceries (22%)	T-shirts (16%)	Groceries (17%)
Pens (8%)	Groceries (13%)	Hats (14%)	Grocery bag (6%)	Pens (13%)

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

TABLE A9. Partisanship in Mexico, 1994, 2015

	1994	**1997**	**2000**	**2003**	**2006**	**2009**	**2012**	**2015**
Panista	18.5	22.8	27.0	28.8	26.6	22.4	20.3	14.5
Priista	41.4	37.0	32.6	26.0	18.4	29.2	28.4	28.3
Perredista	11.6	11.0	10.4	17.5	22.4	10.9	20.5	9.7
Morena								3.2
Other	2.8	2.2	1.5	1.8	2.2	8.1	5.2	5.9
Independent	25.7	27.1	28.5	25.9	30.4	29.4	25.6	34.0
Partisans	74.3	72.9	71.5	74.1	69.6	70.6	74.4	62.6

Source: Surveys CSES. www.cses.org.

TABLE A10. Type of gifts and GOTV contact. Multinomial logistic regression
DV (type of gifts): no gift, not-vote buying gift, vote buying gift

	PAN		PRI		PRD		Morena		Green	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	No gift	Not-VB	No gift	Not-VB	No gift	Not-VB	No gift	Not-VB	No gift	Not-VB
GOTV	-2.02***	-0.43	-1.95***	-0.63**	-2.18***	-0.66*	-1.53***	0.09	-1.91***	-1.13***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.22)	(0.32)
Election: governor	0.36	0.21	-0.21	-0.67***	-0.41	-0.78**	-0.18	0.08	0.93***	0.27
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.21)	(0.30)
Election: mayoral	-0.26	0.05	-0.46**	-0.19	-0.09	0.05	-0.04	0.36	0.34**	0.46**
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.16)	(0.22)
Incumbent: PRI	0.23	-0.47	0.37*	-0.06	0.36	-0.06	0.54	0.57	0.07	1.35***
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.50)	(0.57)	(0.17)	(0.31)
Incumbent: PRD	0.09	-0.19	0.06	-0.12	-0.70**	-0.41	-0.03	0.70	-0.19	0.84**
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.33)
Middle school	0.33	0.56	-0.48	-0.37	0.47	0.77*	-0.58	0.12	-0.24	0.45
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.87)	(0.94)	(0.24)	(0.36)
High school	0.02	0.08	-0.57*	-0.71**	-0.07	0.12	-0.37	0.25	-0.31	-0.04
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.79)	(0.87)	(0.24)	(0.36)
College+	0.50	0.42	0.01	-0.48	0.45	-0.12	-1.47*	-1.25	-0.06	0.20
	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.56)	(0.82)	(0.94)	(0.28)	(0.45)
Female	-0.29	-0.31	0.27	0.05	-0.34	-0.17	-0.25	-0.20	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Age: 26-40	-0.09	-0.14	-0.24	-0.07	-0.02	0.23	0.23	0.30	-0.12	-0.27
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Age: 41-60	-0.23	-0.17	0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.05	0.46	0.75	0.43**	0.44
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.54)	(0.21)	(0.29)
Age: 61+	0.26	-0.13	0.08	0.23	0.16	0.04	0.86	0.72	0.01	-0.05
	(0.60)	(0.63)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.60)	(1.29)	(1.36)	(0.30)	(0.48)
Precinct: rural/ urban	-0.02	-0.25	1.22***	1.03***	1.26**	1.40**	0.50	0.68	0.76**	0.85**
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.55)	(0.60)	(0.66)	(0.77)	(0.31)	(0.41)
Precinct: urban	0.25	-0.04	0.93***	0.66***	0.58**	0.71**	0.70	0.59	0.39**	0.31
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.18)	(0.27)
PID: PRI	1.25***	0.62*	-1.12***	-0.20	-0.22	-0.16	-0.54	0.33	-0.41*	-0.28
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.70)	(0.82)	(0.23)	(0.34)
PID: PRD	1.74***	0.75	0.46	0.69*	-2.06***	-0.76*	-0.76	0.01	-0.14	0.08
	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.75)	(0.88)	(0.29)	(0.41)
PID: Other	1.35***	0.86*	-0.36	0.07	-0.74*	-0.23	-1.82***	-0.34	-0.74***	-0.11
	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.69)	(0.82)	(0.28)	(0.38)
PID: Indep	2.41***	1.41***	0.45	0.79**	0.02	0.39	-0.05	0.99	-0.50**	-0.39
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.70)	(0.82)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Constant	2.13***	1.52**	2.29***	1.24***	3.72***	0.72	4.94***	-0.37	2.23***	-1.48***
	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.44)	(0.48)	(0.64)	(0.71)	(1.07)	(1.24)	(0.37)	(0.56)
Observations	2299	2299	2297	2297	2297	2297	2300	2300	2292	2292
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.06

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). *Base category:* election (Congress); education (elementary school); age (18-25); precinct (rural); incumbent (PAN), PID (PAN).

TABLE A11. Type of gifts and GOTV contact. Ordered logistic regressions
DV (type of gifts): no gift, not-vote buying gift, vote buying gift
OLOGIT (robustness check)

GOTV	1.69***	1.47***	1.70***	1.61***	1.52***
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.19)
Election: governor	-0.20	-0.22	-0.08	0.24	-0.83***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Election: mayoral	0.31**	0.32***	0.11	0.31	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.13)
Incumbent: PRI	-0.54***	-0.36***	-0.37**	-0.10	0.29*
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.15)
Incumbent: PRD	-0.20	-0.10	0.44***	0.56**	0.35**
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Middle school	0.12	0.22	0.05	0.68*	0.38**
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.19)
High school	0.06	0.12	0.15	0.56	0.28
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.36)	(0.20)
College+	-0.20	-0.32	-0.53*	0.65	0.13
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.23)
Female	0.06	-0.23**	0.25**	0.10	0.02
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.11)
Age: 26-40	-0.01	0.18	0.17	-0.01	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.15)
Age: 41-60	0.09	-0.01	0.07	0.09	-0.25
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Age: 61+	-0.35	0.09	-0.15	-0.32	-0.04
	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.26)
Precinct: rural/urban	-0.20	-0.54***	-0.26	0.01	-0.39*
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.23)
Precinct: urban	-0.28*	-0.52***	-0.16	-0.26	-0.27*
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.15)
PID: PRI	-0.81***	0.95***	0.10	0.77**	0.29
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.38)	(0.19)
PID: PRD	-1.19***	0.00	1.57***	0.74*	0.13
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.42)	(0.23)
PID: other	-0.70***	0.39*	0.60**	1.60***	0.67***
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.40)	(0.22)
PID: indep	-1.27***	0.08	0.28	0.81**	0.32*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.19)
/cut1	0.41	0.74***	2.51***	4.61***	1.90***
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.57)	(0.31)
/cut2	2.59***	2.63***	4.04***	6.20***	2.59***
	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.61)	(0.32)
Observations	2299	2297	2297	2300	2292
R-squared	0.0888	0.0642	0.103	0.0728	0.0455

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015). Standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

FIGURE A1. Distribution of electoral gifts



Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

FIGURE A2. Robustness checks (using alternative SES indictors)



(1) 0-2 103, *(2)* 2 104-4 206, *(3)* 4 207-6 309, *(4)* 6 310-8 412, *(5)* 8 413-10 515, *(6)* 10 516-12 618, *(7)* 12 619-14 721, *(8)* 14 722-16 824, *(9)* 16 825-21 030, *(10)* More than 21 131 Mexican pesos.



(0) Very low, *(1)* Low, *(2)* Middle, *(3)* High. Additive index based on the following questions: "What is the name of the current governor of the state?" "How many chambers does the Mexican Congress have?" and "How many years does a deputy's term last in Mexico?"

FIGURE A2. Robustness checks (using alternative SES indictors) (continuation)





Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).

FIGURE A3. Robustness checks



CD index as a dependent variable: respondents who received phone calls and a letter from any political party. (Using alternative GOTV Index for dependent variable: respondents who received a telephone call and a piece of mail from any political party).



Levels of education: *(1)* Less than elementary school (not finished), *(2)* Elementary school, *(3)* Middle school (not finished), *(4)* Middle school (finished), *(5)* High school (not finished), *(6)* High school (finished), *(7)* College/Grad school.

Source: National Electoral Study, CIDE-CSES (2015).