Coalition Building Strategies and Fiscal Dependence in Mexican Federalism
Keywords:
fiscal federalism, minimal winning coalitions, Banzhaf power index, legislature, MexicoAbstract
This paper explores Mexican fiscal federalism from the point of view of legislative coalitionbuilding. The analysis of connected minimal winning coalitions (CMWC) suggests thatalthough coalition formation will be difficult, given the high degree of party discipline inthe legislature, a reform of fiscal federalism in Mexico is possible. However, such reformcan lead either to a highly redistributive system, which would further reinforce the verticalimbalances of the current arrangement; or to a greater devolution of tax authority benefitingrich states, which would further enhance regional inequality.
Downloads
Issue
Section
License
The authors who publish in this journal agree on the following conditions:
In accordance with copyright laws, Política y gobierno recognizes and respects the authors’ moral rights, as well as the ownership of property rights, which will be transferred to the journal for its dissemination in open access. Política y gobierno does not charge the authors for submitting and processing articles for publication.
All the articles published in Política y gobierno —with no exception— are distributed under a Creative Commons License 4.0 Attribution Non-Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0 International), that allows third parties to use the published work providing they mention the authorship of the work and the first publication in this journal.
The authors can enter into other independent and additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the version of the article published in Política y gobierno (for example to include it into an institutional repository or publish it in a book) as lomg as it is clearly indicated that the work was published for the first time in Política y gobierno.
For all of the above, the author(s) must submit the Format of transfer of the ownership of the first publishing rights duly filled in and signed by the author(s). This format can be sent as a pdf by e-mail: politicaygobierno@cide.edu (Letter- transfer of property rights)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 International.
Contact