Governance with Divided Powers in Latin America

Authors

  • JOSEP M. COLOMER CIDE
  • GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO CIDE

Keywords:

governance, separation of powers, divided government, median voter, social utility, presidentialism, parliamentarism

Abstract

This article discusses a new set of institutional formulas oriented to strengthening theCongress with the aim of promoting good governance in a separation-of-powers system. Itadopts the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voters preferencecan produce highest satisfaction or social utility. Given that certain formulas of proportionalrepresentation in legislative elections tend to establish a close correspondencebetween the median voter and the median party in Congress, a distribution of powersencouraging cooperation between the latter and the President for both legislative decisionsand Cabinet formation can reduce the gridlock interval and favor socially efficientoutcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidentialregimes in Latin America shows that several of the formulas indicated in this work as leadingto good governance in separation-of-powers systems are gaining acceptance in theregion.

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How to Cite

COLOMER, J. M., & NEGRETTO, G. L. (2003). Governance with Divided Powers in Latin America. Política Y Gobierno, 10(1), 13-61. http://politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/347

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