The Institutional Causes of the Argentina Default
Keywords:
economic default, fiscal policies, electoral system, political parties, accountabilityAbstract
This essay questions those interpretations that trace the causes of the Argentine defaultto either the neo-liberal model of economic policy implemented during the 90s or tothe incompetent management of the Argentina economy by the IMF. The main argumentwill be that the central cause of the default (the governments inability to implementresponsible fiscal policies) is rooted in institutional peculiarities of the country; in particular,the pattern of revenue sharing, and the electoral system.
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