Federalismo redistributivo: sobrerrepresentación territorial y transferencia de ingresos en el hemisferio occidental

Authors

Abstract

This article explores the impact of an institutional feature that is intrinsic to most federal systems: the overrepresentation of states and provinces in national legislative chambers. The argument presented is that territorial overrepresentation in effect shapes the regional distribution of funds transferred by central governments in ways that benefit overrepresented states and provinces. Statiscal analyses suggest that, contrary to prevailing expectations, overrepresentation in lower houses of congress has a significantly higher impact than overrepresentation in the senate. The argument is supported by evidence from a comparative analysis of federal revenue sharing programs in the united States, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, and by a case study of the use of pulic spending to support regional electoral coalitions by the government of President Menem in Argentina between 1990 and 1995.

Downloads

Issue

Section

Articles
Metrics
Views/Downloads
  • Abstract
    1320
  • PDF
    817
Further information

How to Cite

Gibson, E. L., Calvo, E. F., & Falleti, T. G. (1999). Federalismo redistributivo: sobrerrepresentación territorial y transferencia de ingresos en el hemisferio occidental. Política Y Gobierno, 6(1), 15-44. http://politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/479