Democracy as hostage : the autonomy of central banking in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy

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This article explores the conditions under which exiting authoritarian elites use institutions strategically to fend off the threat of democracy. One way that authoritarian elites can execute this "institucional insulation" is by making the central bank autonomus from the influence of elected officials befores they leave power. Central bank autonomy not only removes a key aspect  of economic decisionmaking from democratic control, but also constrains governments to persue a set of neoliberal policy outcomes. I argue that ehere authoritaian fear a populist future and know that regime change is inminent they can be expected to create an autonomous central bank in order to tie hands of successor governments. 

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Boylan, D. M. (1998). Democracy as hostage : the autonomy of central banking in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Política Y Gobierno, 5(1), 47-94. http://politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/510