El lanzamiento político de las reformas estructurales en América Latina

Abstract

The economic adjustment and structural reform programsadopted by the emerging democracias of Latin America have questio-ned the prevailing thesis in the 1970s that related the capacity toundertake long-term political changes with authoritarism. Recentexperiences suggests that the new elite's ability to perform changesin economic policies has to do with two factors: the depth of the crisisthese reforms responded to, and the president's capacity to movilzelegislativa majorities through the control of his own party orthrough agreements with other political forces. From the study of fourcases - Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico -, this article arguesthat the economic emergency in which the adiustment programs wereformulated, as well as the presidential nature of Latin Americanregimes brought about a decision-making style, strongly based on theexecutive and on his discretional powers. Nevertheless, this decision-making modality does not constitute a new phenomenon; rather, it ispart of an institutional heritage, much more persitent than thegovemmental policies and programs.