Dominio de partido y dilemas duvergerianos en las elecciones presidenciales de 1994 en México

Abstract

The paper analyses party dominance in México from a social choice perspective. It explores the coordination dilemmas opposition votes face by identifying various types of opposition votes using their complete preference orders among the three major parties, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD. It shows that there are opposition voters who would be willing to strategically vote for the opposition píirty that has the great-est chance of defeating the PRI; however, there are also opposition voters who would not be willing to put their ideological differences aside to defeat the PRI. Moreover, opposition parties possess a large proportion of "rigid" voters who possess weak preferences orders among the three parties and would only vote for their first preference. Henee, despite electoral rules and Duverger's Law, in México three parties survive and there is no tendency towards bipolarity in presidential elections, which in tum strengthens the PRI. The paper also explores, from a game theory perspective, the strategic reasona why the opposition parties have not attempted to coordinate their eíForts by nominating a common presidential candidato capable of seriously challenging the PRI's dominance in presidential elections.