Strong Presidents, Powerful Provinces: The Political-Economy of Party Building in Argentina’s Federal System

Abstract

Recent research highlights two competing trends in studies of Argentina politics. Oneemphasizes the strength of federal institutions; the other the powerful position of presidents in the system. Often depicted as opposing, this paper shows how the presence ofpowerful presidents complements that of strong provincial leaders. It is argued that,thanks to the federalized electoral system, politicians aspiring to national office mustensure the support of provincial political leaders. As long as national leaders have beenable to confer benefits on provincial politicians, provincial leaders have supported themat the polls. Historical analysis of national policy-making during state-led economic developmentshows that presidents used their privileged political positions to channel a varietyof benefits to provincial governments, leading to the development of provincial economiesand stable electoral support in national elections. Analysis of recent economic adjustment,though underscoring the powerful position of presidents and provincial leaders, alsoshows how the inability to provide customary benefits hurts national politicians at thepolls.