Apostar con el voto. Una teoría formal de la influencia de incentivos materiales e inmateriales y del ambiente electoral sobre el comportamiento del votante

Juan David Irigoyen Borunda

Juan David Irigoyen Borunda Florida State University http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6654-2265

Palabras clave: electoral behavior, voting incentives, social influence, US Gilded Age, religious voting

Resumen

¿Por qué alguien cedería ante incentivos exógenos para votar en contra de sus preferencias intrínsecas? Busco responder esta pregunta presentando un juego de votación que modela las decisiones de votantes que creen que podrían recibir un incentivo asociado a su comportamiento. Este juego considera el tamaño del incentivo ofertado, la decisión del votante como una mejor respuesta estratégica al comportamiento de otros votantes, y la competitividad de la elección. Encuentro equilibrios que muestran que ceder ante incentivos exógenos es la mejor estrategia en condiciones no muy rigurosas. Finalmente, ilustro las predicciones del modelo a partir de tres casos en los que se ha observado que incentivos materiales o inmateriales afectaron —o siguen afectando— el comportamiento del votante: compra de votos y la coerción a votantes durante la Edad Dorada de los Estados Unidos, el comportamiento electoral de los afroamericanos y el voto religioso.

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